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I. Introduction
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have for some years
prescribed substantial sentences for high-level corporate
officials convicted of large frauds. Guidelines sentences for
offenders of this type moved higher in zooI with the pas-
sage of the "Economic Crime Package" amendments to the
Guidelines' and higher still in the wake of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002.2 Today, any corporate insider convicted
of even a moderately high-loss fraud is facing a Guideline
range measured in decades or perhaps even mandatory life
imprisonment. Successful sentencing advocacy on behalf
of such defendants requires convincing the court to impose
a sentence outside (in many cases, far outside) the range
prescribed by the Guidelines. Conventional "departure" or
"variance" arguments emphasizing particular characteris-
tics of the client or the offense remain important; however,
Guideline sentencing levels for corporate officers in big
frauds are currently so high that individualized arguments
must be paired with the more fundamental contention that
the Guidelines no longer provide useful guidance for sen-
tencing such defendants. This Article lays out this
fundamental argument, and explores its limits.
II. Serious Corporate Fraud in the Post-Booker World
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck down
the Guidelines as an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth
Amendment but immediately resurrected them by judi-
cially amending the Sentencing Reform Act to transform
the previously binding sentencing rules into an "essentially
advisory' system. This is not the place for a dissection of
Booker or of the high courf s subsequent convoluted efforts
to make sense of its own odd creation. Only those with a
well-developed taste for insoluble paradox should think too
carefully about Booker and its progeny.3 For practical
lawyers, the current lay of the land is as follows.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain in effect.
Judges must make the same findings of fact and perform
the same Guidelines calculations as were required before
Booker.4 The precise legal weight trial and appellate judges
ought to accord the Guideline ranges produced by those
findings and calculations remains something of a puzzle-
ment, but two things are clear. First, the Guideline range
remains important. As the Court said in Gall v. United
States, 'As a matter of administration and to secure nation-
wide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark."5 Trial judges may not
presume that the Guideline range represents a reasonable
sentence6 (though appellate courts apparently can do just
that7). But the Court insists that the range nonetheless
continues to be of sufficient importance that, if a judge
"decides that an outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted,
he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure
that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support
the degree of the variance. We find it uncontroversial that
a major departure should be supported by a more signifi-
cant justification than a minor one."8
Second, in Gall and its companion case, Kimbrough v.
United States,9 the Court suggested that a properly calcu-
lated Guideline range retains its influence because the
Guidelines are the product of careful study and delibera-
tion by an expert agency, the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
Importantly, however, the Court held that a judge may
impose a non-Guidelines sentence based on disagreement
with Commission policy judgments embodied in applica-
ble Guidelines.'0 Indeed, in Kimbrough, a decision
upholding a significant downward departure in a crack
cocaine case, the Court went still further. Justice Gins-
burg's opinion recounted at length the history of the debate
over the crack-powder sentence differential, noting that the
Commission's views on appropriate sentences for crack
cocaine offenders have for some years been at odds with its
own Guidelines, but that Congress has repeatedly blocked
efforts to change the well-known Ioo-r crack-powder ratio
or otherwise reduce Guidelines crack sentences. Justice
Ginsburg's opinion strongly implies that a Guideline may
be entitled to less judicial deference if it resulted from a
process in which the expert judgment of the Commission
was influenced or overridden by Congressional directives.
One cannot help but note the extreme oddity of this
suggestion. One scarcely would have thought that a rule-
making agency's opinions about an issue, published in
reports but never successfully enacted as a rule or Guide-
line, would be entitled to more legal weight than the
agency's own rule covering the same issue. Moreover, the
Commission is a creation of, and constitutionally subordi-
nate to, the democratically elected Congress. The
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suggestion that the Commission's opinions should be pre-
ferred to its Guidelines looks even odder when the
Guideline in question was enacted and maintained for
twenty years despite much controversy, in accordance with
the clearly expressed judgment of Congress.
Be that as it may, the weight that continues to be
accorded to the Guidelines after Booker depends on the
implicit, albeit now contestable, assumption that Guide-
line ranges are rationally supportable and broadly
consistent with the stated aims of the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984 in 18 U.S.C. I 3553(a). As the Court observed
in Kimbrough, "in the ordinary case, the Commission's rec-
ommendation of a sentencing range will 'reflect a rough
approximation of sentences that might achieve 5 3553(a)'s
objectives.'"" In most fraud cases, judges are likely to pro-
ceed from the assumption that a Guidelines sentence is in
accord with the expert judgment of the Commission, con-
sistent with the objectives of Section 3553(a), and, in
general, a rational and legally supportable result.
However, in fraud cases involving officers of public
companies, the Guidelines have become over the past few
years an increasingly imperfect measure of an appropriate
sentence. For the small class of defendants consisting of
corporate officers convicted of fraud offenses associated
with very large Guidelines loss calculations, the Guide-
lines now are divorced both from the objectives of Section
3553(a) and, frankly, from common sense. Accordingly, the
Guidelines calculations in such cases are of diminished
value to sentencing judges.
A. Repeated Exponential Guidelines Increases
Have Produced Irrational Severity
The sentences prescribed by the Guidelines have increased
steadily and repeatedly since 1987 for all classes of economic
offenders.2 One can argue that the last several rounds of
across-the-board increases were rationally defensible, even if
ill advised.3 But for officers of public companies convicted of
very large frauds, the Guidelines have escalated beyond
rational constraints. Figure i illustrates the point by charting
the offense levels and corresponding sentencing ranges that
the Guidelines prescribed in 1987, 1989, 1998, 2ooi, and
2007 for a hypothetical corporate chieftain akin to the lead-
ers of Adelphia, WorldCom, or Enron. These calculations
assume conviction of offenses that implicate securities laws
and cause losses greater than $400 million (the largest num-
ber now included in the Guidelines loss table) and the
collapse or near collapse of a big company.
Figure 1. Guideline Sentence Ranges for
Hypothetical Corporate CEO
Guidelines
version 1987 1989 8998 2001 2007
Offense 254 32'5 386 48V 5718
level
Sentencing 57-7 M2-151 235-293 Life Life
Range Months Months Months (+ (+14
levels) levels)
Several points are immediately obvious. First, the
offense levels prescribed by the 2OO and 2007 versions
of the Guidelines reflect a failure on the part of the Com-
mission to consider adequately the effect of recent
amendments on high-loss corporate fraud cases. 9 The
point of sentencing Guidelines is to give meaningful
guidance to sentencing judges by subdividing the uni-
verse of possible sentences into ranges and assigning
defendants to those ranges based on the presence or
absence of relevant factors. A sentencing regime so
imprecisely calibrated that it generates sentencing ranges
for property crimes from 5 to 14 notches higher than nec-
essary for life imprisonment is useless to a judge
attempting to craft sentences in a serious corporate
white-collar case. If disposed to take a very stringent view
of corporate wrongdoing, one might be able to rationalize
a multi-decade term for the very worst-of-the-worst,
biggest-of-the-biggest corporate criminal, but under the
current Guidelines a corporate officer who presides over a
fraud involving securities and a loss of only $2.5 million
can qualify for life imprisonment. 0 A system pegged to
such extreme levels of severity no longer provides a
means of distinguishing between more and less culpable
defendants and instead sweeps virtually any significant
participant in a large corporate fraud into the same unre-
alistically punitive category.
Second, the astounding diversity of outcomes called for
by successive versions of the Guidelines between 1987 and
2007 yields little confidence that any iteration of the
fraud/theft Guideline provides a reasonable basis for sen-
tencing cases like the hypothetical corporate CEO. Since
Booker, the Government consistently has argued that the
Guidelines accurately reflect and carefully balance all of
the sentencing considerations enumerated in the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act and, therefore, that a sentence within a
properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively rea-
sonable. However plausible that position may be in
general, it requires courts to accept that in 1987 a reason-
able sentence for our hypothetical corporate chieftain
would have been less than 6 years, in 1989 a bit more
than 12 years, in 2000 more than 24 years, in 2001 life in
prison plus another 5 offense levels, and in 2007 life plus
14 offense levels. Neither the principles embodied in the
Sentencing Reform Act, nor the dictates of reason, nor the
nature of economic crimes changed sufficiently between
1987 and 2007 to justify this exponential progression.
Moreover, the Guidelines provide no help to a judge trying
to identify a moment in the progression from 6 years to
life-plus-14-offense-levels when the Guideline range was
a meaningful embodiment of the objectives of Sec-
tion 3553(a).
Third, any rational assessment of whether a sentence
accords with the injunction of 18 U.S.C. S 3553(a)(2)(A)
that sentences must "reflect the seriousness of the
offense.., and ... provide just punishment for the
offense" requires not only comparison with other
offenses and offenders of the same general type but also
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comparison between offense types. While corporate fraud
is certainly a serious offense, it is hard to argue that it is
more serious than murder and several orders of magni-
tude more serious than armed robbery. In 2005, the
average sentence actually imposed on a robber with no
prior criminal record was 57 months, or less than 5
years.2 Even robbers who were also Criminal History Cat-
egory VI career offenders (meaning they had roughly five
prior felony convictions) received an average of only 168
months, or 14 years.22 The average sentence for all mur-
derers regardless of prior criminal record was less than
19 years.23 And in 2005, the mean sentence imposed on
murderers who were also career offenders was 297.5
months, or just shy of 25 years. 4 By comparison, Bernie
Ebbers of WorldCom got 25 years2 5 and Jeffrey Skilling of
Enron 242.
There are, of course, those who argue that Ebbers,
Skilling, the Rigases of Adelphia, and other recent mar-
quee corporate convicts deserved the sentences they
received. But even if one accepts that argument, the
Guidelines remain useless in such a case. Under the
current Guidelines, a judge who wanted to impose a 25-
year sentence on an Ebbers, a Skilling, or a Rigas, thus
equating their economic offenses with murder by a five-
time felon, would have to depart downward 19 offense levels
to do it.
B. The Behavior of Judges and Prosecutors
The sentences nominally prescribed by the Guidelines for
high-loss corporate fraud cases have become so draconian
that judges are unwilling to impose them even in the
biggest and most publicly notorious cases. Among recent
high-profile corporate insider defendants accountable for
losses in the hundreds of millions or higher, so far as I
know only one, Jeffrey Skilling, has received a sentence
within the applicable Guideline range. Bernie Ebbers's 25-
year-sentence was a downward departure from the
applicable 3o-year Guideline minimum. The Guidelines
called for life imprisonment for both the Rigases. David
Wittig and Douglas Lake of Westar confronted Guidelines
calculations calling for life imprisonment but received
"only' i8 and 15 years (before their convictions were over-
turned on appeal).26 And as long as Skilling's sentence
was, it fell within the Guideline range only because Judge
Lake applied the more lenient 2ooo Guidelines to his
case.
In sum, since Booker, virtually every judge faced with a
top-level corporate defendant in a very large fraud has con-
cluded that sentences called for by the Guidelines were too
high. This near unanimity suggests that the judiciary sees a
consistent disjunction between the sentences prescribed by
the Guidelines for cases like these and the findamental
requirement of Section 3553(a) that judges impose sen-
tences "sufficient, but not greater than necessary" to comply
with its objectives. As Judge Sim Lake, the presiding judge
in the Skilling case, ruled in reducing the sentence of Dyn-
egy defendant Jamie Olis, in an appropriate high-loss
corporate fraud case, the objectives of Section 3553(a) can be
achieved with a lower-than-Guideline sentence. 27
Moreover, recent cases strongly suggest that the
Department of Justice itself is only weakly committed to
the position that the astronomically high sentences called
for by the Guidelines are required either as a matter of just
deserts or in order to achieve deterrence or other objec-
tives of Section 3553(a). For example, although the
sentences imposed in both the Ebbers and Rigas cases
were significantly below the Guideline range, it does not
appear that the Government cross-appealed the sentences
of any of these defendants. On appeal, the Government
defended Bernie Ebbers's sentence as "reasonable.
"28
Perhaps even more revealing is the Government's
behavior toward corporate-officer defendants who coop-
erated in recent high-profile cases. A full review of the
fate of cooperators in recent high-profile frauds is
beyond the scope of this essay, but several examples are
illustrative. In the Enron prosecution, the Government
obtained cooperation from a number of high-level corpo-
rate insiders with significant personal culpability.
Virtually every one of these cooperating defendants, if
prosecuted to the full extent of the law, convicted, and
sentenced strictly in accordance with the Guidelines,
surely would have fallen into Guideline ranges on the
order of 20 years to life imprisonment. Yet the highest
sentence actually imposed on any cooperating defendant
was the 6 years received by Enronds chief financial offi-
cer, Andrew Fastow.2 9 The others fared even better.
Enron Treasurer Ben Glisan (5 years),30 Assistant Trea-
surer Lea Fastow (i year),3' Assistant Treasurer Timothy
Despain (4 years' probation); Global Finance Managing
Director Michael Kopper (3 years), 32 head of investor
relations Mark Koenig (18 months)," investor relations
official Paula Rieker (2 years' probation),34 and Dave
Delainey, chair and CEO of Enron Energy Services (30
months).35 The average prison sentence among the coop-
erators who received time was just over 3 years. Perhaps
even more striking was the Governments deal with
Enron Executive Vice President Richard Causey, who did
not cooperate but received only 5/2 years after entering
into a plea agreement in which the Government agreed to
a maximum 7-year term and later recommended a reduc-
tion from that cap.
36
Similarly, in the WorldCom case, Chief Financial
Officer Scott Sullivan, who according to the Govern-
ment's own appellate brief "directed the fraud,"37
received a 5-year sentence,3S one-fifth the length imposed
on CEO Ebbers. Other cooperators in the case, as
Ebbers's appellate brief pointed out, received i year and
day (Myers), i year and i day (Yates), 5 months followed
by 5 months of home detention (Vinson), and 3 years of
probation (Normand).39
Although no precise calculation is possible, the sen-
tence discounts conferred in these cases appear strikingly
large in both absolute and percentage terms-on the order
of 15 to 20 years or more and 75 to 8o percent or more
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below the Guideline range that would have applied absent
cooperation. Given that the median substantial assistance
departure in federal cases since 2ooo has been roughly
25 to 28 months, or about 50 percent below the otherwise
applicable range, 40 the magnitude of the sentence dis-
counts afforded these cooperating defendants suggests
that they were not merely a reward for effective coopera-
tion, but a sub rosa acknowledgment by both prosecutors
and the courts that the starting point for departures in
these cases should be far lower than the Guidelines nomi-
nally require. Further evidence that the Government
holds this view is found in its repeated willingness to
enter into charge bargains (such as those of Mr. Fastow,
Mr. Causey, and Mr. Kopper in the Enron matter) that
dramatically lower the defendant's sentencing exposure
even before any reduction for substantial assistance is
granted.
Ill. The Problem of Cumulative Effects of Closely
Related Sentence Adjustments
The consistent judicial (and prosecutorial) reluctance to
impose the extraordinarily high sentences the Guidelines
now prescribe in high-loss corporate fraud cases is not
surprising. Even in the pre-Booker period, when the Guide-
lines were mandatory, the Commission recognized that it
had not constructed a perfect edifice and that departures
were appropriate in cases where the Commission failed to
give "adequate consideratioY' to some factor or factors
important to the imposition of a just sentence. 4I In the
wake of Booker, even greater responsibility devolves upon
the sentencing judge to ensure that the occasional and
inevitable failure by the Commission to properly consider
the effects of its complex Guidelines on particular cases
does not produce unjust punishments.
Judges should be particularly sensitive to the Commis-
siofs failure to consider adequately the cumulative effects
of a number of closely correlated sentence enhancements
that cluster in cases of high-loss fraud by corporate offi-
cers. The Commission has done a commendable job of
identifying factors that ought to be considered in sentenc-
ing an economic offender, such as the amount of loss
inflicted by an economic offense,42 the complexity of the
scheme devised by the defendant,43 the number of affected
victims,- the size of a defendants personal gain,45 dam-
age to financial institutions,46 and the factors in Chapter
Three relating to role in the offense. All of these are theo-
retically relevant to offense seriousness and therefore to
punishment. But the Guidelines do a poor job of quantify-
ing the sentencing effects of these factors when many of
them interact in a single case.
Both the former fraud Guideline, Section 2Fi.i, and its
current successor, Section 2BI, embody two basic quan-
tification errors. The first is the assignment of
independent weight to factors such as those identified
above that, in practice, often are present together. When
the Guidelines first were enacted in 1987, the fraud Guide-
line consumed a single page of text and enumerated only
six factors determinative of offense level-amount of loss,
plus five others.47 At the time, loss was understood to
serve as a valid proxy for most of the considerations rele-
vant to offense seriousness in economic crimes. However,
in the years following 1987, the Commission continually
added new specific enhancements in Section 2Fi.I and
elsewhere. By 2000, the number of specific offense char-
acteristics (SOCs) in Section 2Fi.i had ballooned to i.
The current consolidated economic crime Guideline, Sec-
tion 2B1., contains at least 29 sentence-enhancing SOCs,
and perhaps more, depending on how one counts the sub-
sections.
The effect of this proliferation of SOCs is demon-
strated graphically by the Guidelines calculations for the
hypothetical CEO in Figure i above. This imaginary defen-
dant, in common with many real ones, receives upward
offense-level adjustments for more than minimal plan-
ning,48 use of a sophisticated scheme,49 number of
victims,50 derivation of a large personal gain,5' leadership
role,52 and abuse of a position of trust.53 All these factors
are closely correlated in the sense that any corporate offi-
cer found guilty of a large-loss corporate fraud is virtually
certain to be subject to all of them. Yet each of these fac-
tors generates a separate offense-level increase in addition
to the separate and substantial offense-level increase pro-
vided for a high loss amount itself. In effect, what the
Guidelines have done over time is to tease out many of the
factors for which loss served as a rough proxy and to give
them independent weight in the offense-level calculus.
The second quantification error arises out of the loga-
rithmic structure of the Guidelines' sentencing table.
Because the sentencing table was constructed according to
constraints imposed by the so-called "25 percent rule," the
size of the sentence increase associated with each one-
offense-level increase grows steadily the further one
travels up the vertical offense-level axis.54 Thus, a one-
offense-level increase at the bottom of the table changes a
defendant's sentencing range not at all,55 whereas the
same one-offense-level increase at the top of the sentenc-
ing table increases the defendant's minimum sentence by
3 years and his maximum sentence from 30 years to life
imprisonment.56 The result is that many factors for which
loss already was a proxy not only have been given inde-
pendent weight but also impose disproportionate
increases in prison time because they add offense levels
on top of those already imposed for loss itself and do so at
the top of the sentencing table, where sentencing ranges
are wide.
The Sentencing Commission itself has recognized this
phenomenon. In the Commission's Fifteen-Year Report on
the operation of the Guidelines between 1987 and 2002,
the Commission acknowledged the deleterious effects of
what it called "factor creep" and observed that "as more
and more adjustments are added to the sentencing rules,
it is increasingly difficult to ensure that the interactions
among them, and their cumulative effect, properly track
offense seriousness."57
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The failure to ensure that the interactions and cumu-
lative effects of numerous closely correlated factors
properly track offense seriousness is most notable in
high-loss corporate fraud cases. Any case involving a cor-
porate officer and a multimillion-dollar loss will almost
always trigger application of multiple offense-level
enhancements that have the effect of punishing the
defendant over and over for the same basic thing-con-
ducting a big fraud in a corporate setting. Before Booker,
the Second Circuit recognized the dangers of "factor
creep" in high-loss white-collar cases and endorsed a
departure from the Guideline range on that ground in
United States v. Lauerson.58 Although the judgment in
Lauerson was vacated by the Supreme Court during the
wave of post-Booker litigation, the Second Circuit's rea-
soning remains compelling.
IV. The Interplay of "Loss" and Culpable Mental State
In high-loss corporate fraud cases, the substantial offense-
level enhancement provided for loss may itself overstate
the seriousness of the defendant's offense. Loss plays a
central role in the Guidelines because it reflects, directly
or indirectly, factors that historically have been considered
important to sentencing economic criminals. "[Lioss
serves multiple purposes. That is, actual loss is not only a
direct measure of harm, but also an important proxy
measurement of mens rea. Similarly, intended loss serves
as a direct measurement of mental state, but also as a
rough measure of the risk of real harm presented by the
defendant's conduct."59 However, precisely because loss
serves multiple purposes and measures some factors rele-
vant to criminal blameworthiness directly while acting as
an indirect and imperfect proxy measurement of other fac-
tors, it can in an individual case overstate or understate
the seriousness of an offense or the degree of the defen-
dant's criminal culpability.
Indeed, the Guidelines themselves recognize the
imperfections of the loss measurement. Both the current
consolidated economic crime Guideline and the former
fraud Guideline expressly sanction departures from the
otherwise applicable sentencing range where the loss (or
in the current Guideline, the overall offense level) "over-
states the seriousness of the offense."6o It is worth noting
that the imprecision of the loss measurement is the only
ground for downward departure expressly recognized in
the economic crime Guidelines. In the wake of the Booker
decision, a sentencing court plainly has even more latitude
to take account of the imperfections of the loss measure-
ment in any given case.
For example, the Guidelines loss enhancement may
fail to distinguish between defendants who intend to steal
or cause economic harm to others and defendants who,
though guilty of criminal conduct, cause losses they nei-
ther desired nor perhaps even foresaw. Likewise, the loss
enhancement may be prone to overstate the criminal cul-
pability of defendants in cases involving overly aggressive
accounting treatments designed to maintain or increase
the stock price of legitimate businesses and other behavior
at the borderlines of the law.
Speaking broadly, criminal liability is premised on
proof of an act or culpable omission, a harm (or at least
the risk of harm), and a culpable mental state. 6' Likewise,
the severity of offenses and their attendant punishments
are ranked by categorizing the severity of harms caused or
risked, the state of the defendants mind, and, in the case
of completed crime, the causal relation between the defen-
dant's conduct and the resultant harm.6 2
A peculiar feature of American property crimes gen-
erally and federal fraud crimes in particular is that,
unlike crimes against persons, statutory law does not
rank the severity of offenses according to differences in
the mental states of defendants. Federal law uses many
different terms for culpable mental state.63 And even ver-
bal formulas that have been familiar through long usage,
such as the wire fraud statute's prohibition against
"devis[ing] or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises," have multiple meanings and embrace states
of mind as various as an unvarnished intention to steal
money,64 an intent to deprive a public or private entity of
its intangible right to honest services, and a plan to
deprive a newspaper of confidential business informa-
tion.65 But the myriad mental state provisions of federal
economic crime statutes all relate to liability. Neither fed-
eral statutes nor the Guidelines rank mental states as
more or less serious or attempt to correlate them with
degrees of punishment.
Nonetheless, some culpable mental states associated
with economic crime are more blameworthy than others.
Just as a homicide committed intentionally and after
long deliberation is more blameworthy than a death
resulting from recklessness or criminal negligence,
66
there are meaningful differences between the states of
mind of economic offenders. A defendant who con-
sciously sets out to steal or cause economic loss is more
culpable and deserving of greater punishment than one
who acts dishonestly but without the desire to steal or
cause loss.
The result of the interplay between the rules govern-
ing substantive criminal liability for fraud and those
governing sentencing is that the Guidelines place some-
one who never set out to steal or cause a loss-but could
have foreseen that a substantial loss might occur based
on his actions or omissions-in the same sentencing
range as someone who consciously sought to steal or to
inflict huge financial losses on his corporation, its share-
holders, and its employees. In this way, the Guidelines
embody the view that some quantum of punishment
should be assessed for undesired, but foreseeable, eco-
nomic harms. Nonetheless, fundamental principles of
the law of crime and punishment suggest that the degree
of punishment imposed for what amounts to criminally
negligent infliction of harm should be lower than the
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degree of punishment for intentional infliction of the
same harm. Particularly in view of the additional flexibil-
ity accorded by the Booker decision and the dictates of
Section 3553(a), courts can accommodate traditional crim-
inal justice principles by differentiating between
defendants whose intention from the outset was to steal,
those who did not set out to steal or cause financial harm
but were reckless about the likelihood of harm occurring,
and those who caused financial harms that, while per-
haps legally foreseeable, were far larger than those the
defendants intended or foresaw.
V. Conclusion
There is more than a touch of irony in the current state of
federal sentencing for high-profile corporate offenders. By
pushing unrelentingly for ever-higher sentences for corpo-
rate bad guys, Congress and the Justice Department have
escalated the Guidelines applicable to these offenders to
such absurd heights that no one, not even the Justice
Department itself, takes them seriously. In the pre-Booker
era, this might have produced a mix of a few real, honest-
to-goodness life sentences from those judges who felt
bound by the expressed will of Congress and the Commis-
sion and outright rebellion from other judges who would
refuse to perpetrate what they felt to be an intolerable
injustice. The advent of Booker alters this dynamic. Judges
now are at liberty to disregard Guideline ranges that
appear patently unreasonable and to fashion an appropri-
ate non-Guidelines sentence. But because the Guidelines
are so out of whack for high-loss corporate frauds, judges
and parties to such cases must proceed without even use-
ful "advice" from the Commission. Advocates on both
sides and the court itself will, in effect, be operating in a
pre-1987, Guidelines-free zone, albeit a zone bounded at
the bottom by a general sense that Congress and the Com-
mission intend high-level corporate crime to be strongly
punished.
When operating in this environment, defense advo-
cates may find the arguments in the preceding discussion
useful in holding sentences down. Individual prosecutors
seeking to hike sentences for noncooperating defendants
will doubtless stress the harms, economic and otherwise,
inflicted by corporate crime and the imperative of
responding forcefully to those who commit it. The Depart-
ment of Justice as an institution ought perhaps to consider
whether its interests are best served by maintenance of
untenably stringent rules or by a sensible revision of the
Guidelines governing corporate crime to produce sentenc-
ing ranges that are both appropriately stem and judicially
acceptable in a post-Booker world.
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